







A Navy Management School Research Paper
By LCDR John L. Taylor, USN
ABSTRACT
There have been many studies made in the Navy vMch attempt to find
the reasons -why so many capable officers turn their backs on a Navy career.
The writer feels that one of these reasons is an attitude which prevails
that the naval officer profession is assigned relatively low status or low
prestige. Since prestige is such an intangible, it is not possible to cover
all areas of the spectrum of prestige. However, an attempt is ma.de to touch
on both sides of the issue by looking at the public viewpoint and the self-
image of the naval officer.
A few public opinion type' polls are cited in this paper. Not much
weight is given to them because of the several types of bias which appear
when such a subject is discussed. More important than polls are the attitudes
which come to light through the actions of the mass communications networks,
the officials of the Government, and contacts with the public by naval offi-
cers. In discussing these attitudes, the writer tries to spotlight some of
the forces which act against prestige. As a result, it becomes evident that
in many instances the Navy is its own worse enemy. The prestige of the na-
val officer is challenged almost daily. This paper attempts to provoke
thought how these challenges lead to frustration and lower the self-image.
Some of the Navy attempts to improve prestige, such as the resurrec-
tion of the sword, are empty tokens. The fact that attempts are made is an
admission that the problem exists. Unfortunately, the problem is not under-
stood. The writer recognizes that some of the recommendations advocate
sweeping changes. Other recommendations request the action of the reader
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The Armed Forces are continuously studying the factors which
•act or repel capable young men into, away from or out of the
military services as a career. Because of the continuing need to
maintain large forces capable of providing security to our nation
since the end of World War II, most of the emnhasis has been con-
centrated on this problem since that time. The procurement of offi-
cers d\ ring e declared war is a problem because of the necessity to
obtain large numbers of qualified men from the manpower available.
At such a time there is no retention problem since most officers -re
frozen in the services for the duration of hostilities. Procurement
and retention of officers become prnssinp- during times of peace or
relative pe^ce, in spite of legislative restrictions on the total
strength of the respective services which reduce them drastically
from their wartime highs. It is imperative, therefore, that the
services obtain the best possible caliber of young men and retain
them in the services, if the Armed Forces are to prevent mediocrity
and build the types of organization which will resnond no matter
which of the many "panic buttons" might be pushed. As an adjunct
to this thought is the cold fact that the services which pre in be-
ing on "D-Day" will be the nucleus around which will be formed the
grertly expanded forces of war.
IV

Yet the battle for the cream of the crop of our -ounr men is
waged with an alphabet of weapons "which are used either consciously
or unconsciously b-- the military and civilian worlds of endeavor.
'.
r
fe find that adventure is counterbalanced by deprivation; service
to Country is counterbalanced by public criticism; fringe benefits
are matched by industry or " rhittled away by Congress and pay is
falling further behind civilian careers with comparable responsibil-
ities. These are but a few of the factors which influence the
choice or rejection of a military career in perference to others.
To narrow this field is difficult since the factors are so closely
related to one another and blend into what I call the spectrum of
prestige. To examine a subject as broad as this the service elements
will be separated and only one of them explored, since I feel that
the spectrum of prestire for each service is different. Therefore,
only the Navy element will be studied in this paper and it Will be
condensed further by focusing on a small part of the Navy spectrum
of officer ore stipe.
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that prestige is one
of the most important aspects in the life of a career naval officer.
As a corollary, it follows that the higher the prestige attached to
being a naval officer, the greater will be the prestige of the
naval service and the more attractive it will be to those who are
still too young to be a part of it as well at to those of us on active

duty and in the reserve components. Further, it is contended that
officer prestige is currently in a period of ascendancy; however,
positive and determined steps must be taken to prevent its future
decline.
This need for increasing prestige has been recognized by the
Department of Defense.
There is a common saying in the services, and elsewhere,
that greater privileges grovr out of greater responsibilities,
and that the latter justifies the former. This is part truth
and part fable
.
In military organizations, as in industry, business, rnd
political life, the more important a man's position, the riore
lavish he is likely to be in his office appointments and liv-
ing arrangements, and the greater the care that is apt to be
taken of freeing him of trifling annoyances. . . TJhen men are
successful, they like the good things in life. Why deny it?
Not one individual in 10,000 would aspire to power and author-
it;'- if it meant living like a hermit. There is no way that the
military establishment can denture human nrture, and change
this determining condition, nor is there any reason why it
s) ould wish to do so. Its men, like all others develop s sense
of well being from those advantages, many of them minor, which
attend, and build prestige, both in private and in official
life. . . It is by enhancing the prestige of leaders and by
making their positions attractive that the Armed Forces ret
better officers and men.
. . At all levels, men will aspire
more, and their ambition will be firmer, if fretting ahead will
mean for them an increase in the visible tokens of deference
from the majority, rather than simply a boost in paycheck.
1
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THE NATURE OF PRESTIGE
Prestif-e brings to mind such words as esteem, status,
recognition, respectability, trust, confidence, honor and
social class. There are two principal T'ays to look at prestige.
It can be the viewpoint of the public at large or it can be an
organizational self-image. Whichever is used, there are like
and different connotations to each viewpoint. Vance Packard
has listed six factors which he used to assign prestire to occu-
pations in his book The Statu s Seekers.
1. The importance of the task performed.
2. The authority and responsibility inherent in the job.
3. The knowledge required.
4. The brains required.
5. The dignity of the job.
6. The financial reward of the occupation.''
It is offered that there are other factors which influence
the prestige or status assigned to the naval officer, such a»J
1. Historical aspects.
2. Current events or information.
3. Lack of information or misinformation.
2
Vance Packard, The Status Seekers, pp. 94-97.

The introductory sentence of The Professions! Soldi er, a re-
cent study of the social and political background of the military
officers, states, "The civilian imaqe of the professional soldier
remains firmly rooted in the past . . . the outdated and obscure
conceptions of the military establishment persist because civilian
society, including the alert political public, prefer to remain
3
uninformed." This apoears to bear out two of the three points
made above but will be covered in more detail later. Current events,
as a factor of prestige, will also be more fully covered and go hand-
in-hand -with lack of information or misinformation.
As far as the motivating forces to increase prestige, it is
readily understandable that the civilian populace, with a few ex-
ceptions, has little motivation or desire to increase the prestire
of the naval officer. Thes^ exceptions are worth mention as they
do much work in this field. The ITavy League of the United States
and the Ilaval 'icademy Alumni Association are the more active organ-
izations. However, the motivation of any group to enhance self-pres-
tige is one of the driving forces of any occupation or organization,
but it is almost entirely up to the members of each distinct group
and is of little concern to those outside the group. This is but
one reason why we in the naval service have a common obligation to one
another to do everything we can to enhance our own prestige. Morris
3
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 3.

Janowitz makes this some point very veil. "But, as the military
profession grows larger and sociplly more heterogeneous, as it
baccm^s more of a career, does not pressure develop for presti;
e
recognition by the public at large? -Jvery professional soldier,
like every businessman or government official, represents his es-
4
tablishment and must work to enhance the preftige of his profession,"
"iBE CONCERN FOR PRESTIGE
"The incentive system by which our country has prospered
has always recognized that privilege is n reward for effort r-nd
enterprise. The American people hnve always accepted that reason-
able, harmless privileges should attend merit. It is by enhancing
the prestige of leaders and by making their positions attractive
5
that the Armed Forces r-et better officers nnd men." IWal officers
h^ve had many experiences with the qu^st for prestie-e and have been
taught from their earliest n^val days that "rank hath its privileges."
They have also seen a decrease in the privileges to which they thought
they were entitled rnd certainly h?ve seen one of the reasons for
such decreases. This reason is the abuse of privileges by a few for
which the many are made to pay. let the fact remains that, although




The Armed Forces Officer, op. cit. p. 25.

of prestige when they report to their first command, they are pro-
bably not prepared for the first shock of being the "boot ensign,"
and take a certain amount of precious time to recover from the
effects of the blow. From this time on, the young officer starts
his uphill battle for recognition and prestige.
In view of the foregoing, I feel it necessary to dispel any
notion that a "kid glove" type of treatment for our junior officers
is advocated. The only intent at this time is to set the stage for
the recommendations and to emphasize the fact that one of the rea-
sons for this study is to make the reader pware that prestige plays
an important part in the retention of our junior officers. It is
hoped that the reader will pause a moment and reminisce of the "good
old dayt" before the Navy started "going to hell." Was that first
year of commission all "sweetness and lirht"?

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF PRESTIGE
There are few people remaining in the United States to-
day who can remember back much further than the Spanish-American
War. Anything which is known about naval officers who served
their country prior to that time has been leprned through the var-
ious means of communications which convey historical information.
We in the naval service look back to events which occurred prior to
the turn of the century as tradition formulating happenings ps well
as historical facts. That some of this tradition has become a part
of our national heritage is entirely nossible and it is unlikely
that there are many people who hold naval officers of the historical
past in anything but high es'eera since the only names ~hey remember
are the names of the heroes.
The Spanish-American War was primarily a naval victory which
was culminated in he revenge of the MAIWE and Dewey's famous Battle
of Manila Bay. After this came the world cruise of the "Great White
Fleet," which displayed the American flag throughout the world and
increased the prestige of the American citizens everywhere. Not long
after, came World War I and with it a gradual rise in the prestire
of all services because it was the patriotic way to think, if nothing
else, as this war was not primarily naval in nature. Following this
war prestip-e declined, as it does after almost any war, but it sank

to a new low following the disarmament conferences in 1922 and 1930,
Between "forId War I pnd World 'f.'ar II, the Armed Forces wore in a
period of relative stagnation, but from the low ebb of the 1920s
to the e^rly 1930s, prestige could go no way but up. During the
depression vears of the 1930s, many young men entered the service
academies for the express purpose of obtaining the free, "$25,000
education," as it used to be referred to, before inflotion. Jan-
owitz refers to this period as the "Growth of Careerism, " and points
out how the social background of academy applicants changed from one
of high social status and members of service families to one of
6
broader social base. It was evident to the writer at this time, while
attending junior high and senior high school in a "Navy town, " that
the nnval officers and their families enjoyed high status and pres-
tire, although at that time I hardly knew the definition of the -ords.
Navy commanders were furnished with two and three story government
quarters, with servants quarters in the rear. A new prestige auto-
mobile seemed to be in every garage, the surrounding grounds were kept
beautifully landscaped and trimmed and Ihe many fringe benefits which
theso families enjoved were quite evident. A point worth emphasizing
at this time is the fact that my exposure to such status symbols
through pssociption with Navy Juniors did not p;ive me my initial mo-
tivation toward a navy career, but it did affect my ultimate decision.




By sheer numbers alone, it v/as possible for almost anyone who had
two years of college to obtain a commission. As a result of this
rapid n-rowth and promotion acceleration, where it seemed only nec-
essary to be possessed of a warm body to insure selection by AINav,
leadership suffered, morale suffered, and millions of enlisted men
became fed up with the officers over them who were "officers and gen-
tlemen by act of Congress." With VJ Day and the mass exodus of the
civilian sailor bnck to his natural habitat, the loathsome feeling
toward naval officers and the bad tas e which was still in his mouth
went vdth him. It is evident that there were many nav?l officers who
anxiously awaited their accumulation of necessary number of points
and felt this same way. It is probably safe to say that every enlist-
ed man who served in the Navy during World War II had at least one pet
story to tell the folks back home concerning an incapable, arrogant,
immoral or otherwise unprofessional naval officer with whan he had
come into contact. Simple additionwill reveal the generation to
which these civilians now belong pnd it is offered that many of these
bad impressions still regain firmly rooted.
In the post-war era, therefore, it became popular to ridicule
and to distrust those naval officers who were still in the service.
The naval profession was attacked from all sides by columnists, com-
mentators, novelists, movie script writers, Congressmen and anyone
else who could make himself herd. A new lew ebb was reached during

the reign of Louis Johnson. It is a mntter of conjecture whether
his efforts almost left us high and dry or -whether they nearly
sank us. In nil fnirness to Mr. Johnson, let it suffice to say
that he certainly had plenty of as si stance • It w^s while in a
low state of preparedness, because of the austerity program which
had been forced upon the Navy, that the Korean War suddenly explo-
ded.
The active participation of the Nary in the hostilities in-
creased, once again, the prestige of the officer corps, however,
-ohere were some members of the Naval Reserve who were quite bitter
with the method used for the partial mobilization which took place.
Immediately after the war, prestipe slipped acain for the usual post-
war reasons, but not to the low state which h?d prevailed prior to
Korea.
The Cold War period which we have been in s nco the truce
negotiations of Korea, hns seen a series of brush fires in which
the Navy h?s played a major fire fighting role. Suez, Lebanon, Quenoy,
Viet-Nam, Cuba and Laos are examples of the brush fire type of armed
conflict. These actions have all resulted in the deployment of naval
forces to counter proposed or actual throats and have brought the
dramatic inprct of the necessity of seapower closer to the American
public. As a direct result, the capability of the Navy has been kept
in the Public's. Eyes. This is but one of the reasons, this constant

use of military power, which has caused C. Hright Mills to refer
to the "power Elite," as composed of, "political, economic and
military men," Mills goes on to state that,
Cf the three types of circle that compose the power
elite today, it is the military that has benefited the most
in its enhanced power, although the corporate circles have
also become more explicitly intrenched in the more public
decision-making circles. It is the professional politician
that has lost the most, so much that in examining the events
and decisions, one is tempted to speak of a political vacuum
in which the corporate rich °nd the high warlord, in their
coinciding interests rule.
Mills recognizes the increase in prestige of the military
during periods of strife by statin
,
The prestip-e of public office and military position,
for example, is higher in times of war, when business exec-
utives become dollar-a-year men and railroad colonels, and
all groups rally behind the militant state of war. But
when business-as-usual prevails, when businessmen leave <-ov-
°rnment to others, public office and military status have
often been vilified, ?s the prestige of public employment is
deflated in favor of big business.
In addition, he states that "as military men have become more
powerful during the wars and during the war-like interludes betv.-een,
9
they too have joined the new national prestige scheme.'' Cf course
the power elite to which Mills refers is primarily in the flag-rank
7








of the military, however, it is highly probable that a little of
this increased status and its corresponding drecreases has rubbed
off on the other officers in the rank structure. In view of the
foregoing, I believe that the prestire of the Naval officer which
is synonymous with esteem, recognition, respectability and con-





Public opinion polls h?ve been used by sociologists bo pro-
vide empirical evidence to substantiate the formulation of their
varied hypotheses. It is not possible to attach much weight to
such polls which concern the prestige of naval officers, since there
is bound to be bias of one kind or another. This is caused by the
fact that it mnkes some difference where those polled resided and
what contact, if any, they had hr>d with naval officers. In addition,
the image of the navrl officer in the public eye can range from en-
sign or warrant officer to pdmiral. It is possible, therefore, that
the prestige attached to naval officers by persons residing in Omaha,
Nebraska would be higher than th at which residents of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia woulc1 °ssign, where there is an overabundance of officers.
As a starting point, remrdless of the lack of validity of
public opinion polls, the following list of one poll taken in 1955






5. Minister or Priest.
6. Public School Teacher.





15. Radio or TV Announcer.
16. Enlisted Man in Armed Services.
17. Truck Driver. 10
One of the lists of job prestige -which Pick-rd cites was
taken from a sample made by the. Chicago Tribune in 1956. This
list finds flag-rank military officers in the highest status
group, nrw captains in '-.he second status group, and all other
commissioned officers in the third status group. There was a
11
total of seven status groups listed in this particular poll.
On the other hand, Packard appears to separate most officers from
whpt he en lis the "Real Upper Cl^ss," and place them in the "Semi-
Upper Class*" His definition of members of the latter class states
that they ^re, "mostly confident, energetic , ambitious people who
went away to college, t l en began a career somewhere away from their
home town or neighborhood. Most of them are with a fairly large
organization where they are decision makers serving as managers,
technologists, or persuaders." Admittedly, this is talcing liber-
ties with Packard's adjectives, however, I feel that most successful
navfl officers fit the description, or they would not be successful.
A survey was made in early 1960 by two former n^val officers who
had graduated from the Naval Vcpdemy in a pre-World "Tar II class and
a pre-Korean Tar cl^ss. In this survey these officers contacted
Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., Attitudes of Adult Civilians
Toward the Military Service as a Career.
Vance Packard, The Status Seekers, p. 111.
12

their respective classmates who had also resigned from the Navy
and on whom they had valid addresses. The response to the ques-
tionnaires which were sent out was as follows: Glass of 1941, 57
persons or 66%; Class of 1949, 99 persons or 35^. When asked the
follov/ing question, "Why did you leave the Service?" the question-
naire listed several choices of answers and asked the participant
to check each answer applicable in 'is c«se rlthout rerprd to prior-
ity. The results were «s follows:
Class of 41 Class of 49
Seek more interesting or challenging work. 4:7%
Seek rreater monetary rewards, 26% 48%
Limited opportunity for promotion (CAPT. & above) 28/£ ZQ%
Disillusionment with Navy as a career. 1G. 37/£
When asked, "Hierw do you now rate your life as a civilian com-
pared with what it might have been if you were still in the Navy?"
the answers were ns follows:
Worse Same Better
1941 1949 1941 1949 1941 1949
4 7% 7%> 18# 89>; 74^
\\% 6% 32^ 24%o 57^ 70^
7% 5% 64%o 54:% 30^ 41%





In spite of the answers piven above, and only those questions
which can be related to prestige were quoted, a very revealing pattern
was evident when the question was asked, "Would you like your son to
make a career of the Navy?" "Yes," answers for the Clnss of 1941
13

totaled T$% and for the Class of 1949 were only 49^. It will
be noted that the members of the class of 1941 are the fathers
of those youn^ men who pre now enterinr the age group or pre in
the a~e group where important decisions r.re being made concerning
military service. It is also sur~ested that these former officers
were thinking strictly in terms of having their sons making Navy
careers in the officer levels. The group in question is also
ly biased in View of their previous association with the Wavy.
As mentioned before, I do not put much faith in public opinion polls
and therefore have nr^n^nted this evidence only for it is worth*
In speaking of prestige rating technique in community stratification,
Robert A. Ellis states,
As the very paucitv of the evidence presented here
indicates, much more work needs to be done before any
final conclusion can be drawn about the utility of the
Prestige-rating technioue. Furthermore, the contradictory
results already obtained sugrest quite clearly the neces-
sity for include wide, rather than a narrow, range of
criterion variables in the tests that are conducted.
1'
It would be difficult to conduct a public opinion noil using
the six factors of Packard which hr.ve been listed previously, since
I feel that the public is relatively uninformed concerning the way in which
12
Tully Shelly, Jr., and Richard V7. Taylora "The Civilian Point
of View," Shipmate Aoril 1960, pp. 6-10.
1?.
Robert A. Ellis, "The Pre sti re-Rating Technique in Community
Stratification Research," Human Organization Research, p. 336.
14

these fnctors would apply to naval officers. One pertinent example
comes to mind. I h*ve talked with many civilian friends who were
firmly convinced that naval officers pay no income taxes. Such a
belief is a relic of the v;ar years.
Many of the authors who have written about the public opinion
of the profession of being a naval officer concur that it has rela-
tively low prestige. "In the United States the military profession
does not c^rry rre^t prestire ... officer-ship remains a relatively
14low status profession." Another quotation, which is very close to
beinp identical with the preceding one by Janowitz and with other
statements made in The Professional Soldier , states,
It is clear that public opinion tends to cling to a
traditional concept of the military officer. There is some
realization of the authentic role now played by the military,
but the p-ulf between reality and public concept is great
j
»nd, reality notwithstanding, the attractiveness of a career
as an officer is governed by the concept which the public holds
for such a cpreer. It is generally recognized that, despite
public acclaim of individual military heroes, officership is
a low-status profession."-^
On the other hand, as we have seen previously, 0. Wright Mills








William H. Bines, "A Gall to Arms. . . For Peace," I^rvard
Business Review
, Jan-Feb, 1960, p. 100,
G. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 276.
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I believe thrt in the various opinions expressed above that both
Janowitz °nd Bines h^ve included all military officers as a class
in their conclusions, whereas, Mills is referring to the top eche-
lons of the military" hierarchy.
There are many civilians who are convinced that the only
reason a man makes a career being a naval officer is because that
man does not have enough self confidence to make a living in the
civilian world. There are others to whom I have referred previ-
ously who are still carrying prudges md, b,r now, highly exagger-
ated memories of ".Vorld 'for II or Korean War experiences. Then there
^re those who will never be convinced that the Navy actually coes
to sea. Some look down upon it as a generation of men who are
supported out of the nublic funds and cnred for from the cradle to
the grave. These same people are the ones who rate Navy men as
second cl^ss citizens because of the many fringe benefits which are
provided out of their nockets. All of the foregoing groups of
people could be classified into whst could be called, if the ex-





TIIE IMPOiU'ANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION
The most immediate concern with the public opinion is,
that if the public holds the military profession in low esteem,
it will be more difficult to attract capable young men into the
Navy and to retain those we have in the junior ranks* A far
greater problem is the leng range effects which a lrok of train-
ed personnel will have on the capability of the Navy to accom-
plish its assigned missions. In addition, unfavorable public
opinion enn create h^voc with the legislative processes which
are so necessary to the life of :h° Navy as well ^s the other
services. The concern expressed above has be^n recognized for
some time by our personnel experts and was brought to the atten-
tion of the Secretary of Defense in 1953 by the VJbrible Report.
There exists an unwholesome amount of irresponsible
criticism of the implementation of our national military
policies. The more vociferous of critics aim their slan-
derous attacks at our military lenders whom they refer to
derogatorily, collectively and repeatedly as 'the brass.*
More recently 'the brass' has been extended to connote all
career military officers as a class. The committee cautions
that the continued degradation of career military officers
«s a cl^ss can do irreparable damage to our ability to at-
tract and retain capable personnel. Able and conscientious
men will not indefinitely continue in a profession dishon-
ored by public criticism.
17
Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service as a
Career that will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel,
Department of Defense, Oct. 1953.
17

More recently than the Womble Report, it hps been stated
that,
The conditions of employment of a military officer are
the product of a never-ending stream of public opinion* The
effectiveness of military leaders is deeply conditioned by
the interest and status which civilian societv accords the
profession. In effect, society gets what it pays for.
. . A
public convinced thrt a military career is a low-prestige
profession creates apathy nnd hostility fundamental to leg-
islative inertia. Legislative inertia perpetuates the uni-
versally recognized inferior conditions of employment. The
services Te then unable to compete effectively for quality
officer personnel and the concept perseveres, not always with-
out reason. This is s self-fulfilling prophecy pt work — one
that fulfills itself ps a result of the behavior of the person
who makes the prophecy and believes it.°
Public opinion finds its way to our elected representatives in
Congress . It is offered that most of the letters written to Congress-
men by constituents are an expression of public opinion which is ad-
verse in nature wherever the military is concerned. This is human
nature, for a person who is angered is more likely to spend the time
writing •• letter to his Congressman than a person who hrs something of
a complimentpry nature to say. Having spent two years preparing ans-
wers to Congressional inquiries which related to the alleged performance
of naval officers, the writer found that letters which praised specific
acts of performance were a rarity. In almost every case, these letters,
which were written to Congressmen by their constituents, were concerned
18




with specific incidents and not a general expression of dis-
approval of naval officers as a group. It is only fair to state
that it was also a rarity when the specific allegations were
found to be based upon feet and not distorted, vilhether the Con-
gressman read these letters or the official naval reply is not
known, however, the greater the quantity of adverse type letters
received, the greater the liklihood that public opinion will sway
the Congressman in his way of thinking whenever a Navy subject is
discussed. Officers who have had duty in Y/a.shington, end many who
have not, are well aware of the political fret of life that Congress,
through control of the purse strings, controls the destiny of the
Navy. It should be apparent that if public opinion is good and if
naval officers are held in high esteem by the public, there will be
less apathy on the part Congress toward the Navy. It should be re-
cognized by every naval officer that there are some members of
Congress, especially those on the Armed Services Commit .ees, who
have had long tenure and arc highly informed about naval matters,
and who will probably not be swayed by individual letters of com-
plaint. There are others who are openly anti-Navy and find in such
letters fuel for their fires. There must be another group who can
be swayed by public opinion. It is the latter group which I hope





THE GRASS ROOTS OF PUBLIC OPINION
Every person who is mentally capable forms his own opinion
on matters of which he has concern. The process of forming opin-
ion is a result of things which can be seen or heard, things which
can be perceived by the senses. Personal experiences probably play
the biggest part in the formulation of opinion, however, any form
of mass communication also plays an influential part. Newspapers,
television, radio, magazines, books and movies all act to sway public
opinion one way or another. We pre all propagandized daily in some
way by these media. It is debatable which is least desirable, an
uninformed public or a mis-informed public.
In a survey conducted in 1955 on the Attitudes of 16 to 20
Yepr Old Males Toward the Military Service as a Career it was point-
ed out that 64;^ of the teenagers questioned indicated that they had
formed their opinions of the Armed Services from talking to people
who had been in the service. In a similar survey of adult males,
49% stated the same reason but, in addition, 2Z% stated that their
19
opinions were formed from personal experience in the service. This
indicates that in addition to personal experience, word of mouth is
also important. Word of mouth is easily distorted or exaggerated.
19
Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., Attitudes of 16 to 20 Year Old





It has often been said that one should only believe half of
what one reads in the newspapers. I do not subscribe full to
this point of view, however, I am a firm believer that there is a
certain amount of distortion to almost every stor r w ich is printed.
Contrary to the announced policies of many of our newspapers that
their primary aim is to report the news, their primary aim is really
to sell newspapers. Therefore, many of the dailies rescrt to a de-
liberate distortion of the true fpcts or to the printing of incom-
plete stories. Unfortunately, there are also b few reporters who
are at their literary best whenever they can attach their by-line to
a story which is obviously anti-military. For example, we are still
carrying the scars which a nationally syndicated columnist in Tfe.sh-
ington pave us bpek in 1946 and 1947 when he referred to all military
officers as, "Brass Hats" and to naval officers as "Fancy Dans."
More recently, an anti-military newsman in the San Francisco area
championed the cause of .1 officer who was medically diagnosed
as a paranoid and kept the stor" in print for the better part of a
year. Some of the stories which appeared under his name v/ere absolute
distortions of true fact and some were true as far as they went. The
latter were so worded that when left incomplete, the reader was led to




Since service personnel are both transients and mem-
bers of low-status profession, it is ny observation that
their actions rre ready targets for the loc.^l ond national
press. The press, in tireless pursuit of mediocrity, often
seems anxious to publicize and distort the actions of the
military — on or off duty — to olease those who search
th^ir columns for inconsequential ballyhoo. To quote the
board chairman of the world's largest press empire, 'If I
produced the sort of ppper I really wanted to read, no
one else would want to.'^O
Although it hurts prestige for newspapers to publicize the
pctions of some military officers, there can be little argument
against Actual reporting. On the other hand, freedom of the
press does not give the press license to distort the true fucts of
any situation. Un-rebutted distortions do not enhance prestige.
TELEVISION
The newest of the mass communicption media, television, pro-
bably reaches more oeople than ?iny of the others by virtue of the
sight and sound advantages. There is probrbly less distortion
of the news on television than in the press, since time usually
allows the reporting of fict and restricts editorial comment.
There hrvo been several series which h*ve helped to increase the






as a testimonial to its popularity is Victory at Sea « This is
without doubt the best received of the .p-roup. Others such as
Navy Log , The Silent oervice pnd Men of Annapolis have all help-
ed to inform the oublic of the iaportance of seapower. Occasion-
ally, there appears a Navy type story on the dramatic shows or the
talent shows but no specific comment c?n be made as to the worth of
these. In addition, there are several public service panel dis-
cussions, such as Meet the Press, which thrust our top naval lead-
ers in th^ public view. I think the Navy has faired well in its
bouts with the cameras and the provocative panelists -.ho seem to re-
vel in firing loaded questions. Mills says of these members of the
"power elite," that they are celebrated as a result of the positions
which they hold and the decisions they are crlled upon to make. He
states, "They are celebrities because they have prestige, and they
have prestige because they are thought to have power or wealth. It
is true that they too must enter the world of publicity, become ma-
terial for the mass media, but they are sought as material almost
21
irrespective of what they do on and too these media." Television
plays its part in forming public opinion ^nd, therefore, can do much
in the way of influencing the prestige attached to the naval officer,
The boys on Madison Averue also do their part with their "grey
21
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 83.
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flannel tongues." I recall a recent coffoe ad> in whioh a naval
officer's cap resting conspicuously on a table is supposeed to im-
part a certain status symbol to the home in which this coffee is
being used. I can also remember seeing recently an animated type
pdvertisement which is used for recruiting young men into naval
aviation. In this particular sequence a couple of bouncing cats,
one a saxaphone o layer and the other a drummer pre conversing in the
language of a beatnik about the virtues of a career as a naval
aviator. Man, its really way out. Is Navy money paying for such
tresh? If orestige were measured on a scale, I'm certain that it
would drop ten points each time this particular commercial is shown.
RADIO
Radio is similar to television but it does not have anywhere
near the impact of television. News reports and commentaries prob-
ably play the bigrest part in the forming of public opinion. In the
aforementioned study concerning attitudes of teenagers toward the
military, radio was not even mentioned as a factor which influenced
attitudes.
MAGAZINES
Magazine articles play a definite prrt in impressing the public
,
When asked, "Have you seen anything in a magazine recently that gave
24

you a favorable impression of service men?" Affirmative answers
Wire indicated by 18$£ of the teen-agers and 14% of the rdult
moles. TJhen asked, "Have you seen anything in a magazine re-
cently that gave you an unfpvorpble impression of service men?"
Affirmative answers were received from only 5% of the teenagers
22
and 5% of the adult m*les. Of course, one h^s to be motiva-
ted to re^d certain articles which appear in magazines. This
accounts, in part, for the relatively low percentages which are
given for each side of the picture.
HOVELS
Books have their place too. Anyone who has read these books
will remember the Ensign Pulver of Mister Roberts , the Captain
Queeg of The Caine Mutiny and other stupid officers in novels such
as Don't Go Hear the Wate r, All the Ships at Sea and others. This
type of undesirable publicity does little to increase esteem or
respectability and it is entirely possible that there r>re many
otherwise uninformed who look upon all ensigns as the Pulver var-
iety and all commanding officers as Queers. In many cnses these
books were written by disgruntled former servicemen and were based
upon wartime experiences. At least one Havy captain cashed in upon
22




his access to information and his ability to write, in spite
of the fact that he knew he was ridiculing a part of the officer
corps. As was mentioned previously, it is Admitted th?t the
was sorely locking in leadership at times during both World
War II and Korea. This h.-lped to bring on a rash of post-
novels which portrayed the officer in a bad light* The Honorable
Richard Jackson, former assistant Secretary of the. Wavy for Per-
sonnel and Reserve Forces commented, "Similarly, we must ask if the
spate of critical novels, plays, movies, and cartoons may not hava
been caused in part by real failures in leadership. The themes




All the Ships at 3ea
,
and so on, are those of anger and discu.st, as wall as of sardonic
23
humor over poor leadership." In reference to The Caine Mutiny
and the moral issues involved therein, tfilliam H. VJhyte, Jr. points
out that it is plain that it is not for the individual to question
the system. "An extraordinary point of view, but did Americans
gag on it? In he critical reception of the book most people ^ot
the point - ^nd most of them aerreed. Partly this was a contem-
porary reaction to the sp^te of war books which in lazy anger per-
24
sonified the evil of war in officers and discipline." The books
23 Richard Jackson, "Improvement of Naval Leadership,"
Navy Mana:-^ment Revi ew Feb, 1960, p. 4.
24
T/illiam E. 7\fhyte, Jr. The Organization Man, pp. 225-226.
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are not limited to war novels by our authors who have written best
sellers. One of the often quoted authors whom I have read during
this past yenr is Arthur K. D^vis, a pre-war sociologist who re-
ceived a commission in the Navy and then wrote about his experi-
ences when he returned to civilian life. Some of the quotations
from one of his articles pre most revealing. I object to them
for two reasons. First is because Davis was e member of an "elite"
Fleet Air Wing Staff during World War II. If this is the only duty
w ich he had, then he has never really seen the Navy. Secondly, I
object because an author such ^s Robert Dubin has included Dovis*
article, Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps, which w-s
written shortly after World War II, in his textbook, Human Relations
in Administration . This was printed in 1959 and is supposed to give
the Navy as an example of bureaucracy. Some of the characteristics
of npval organization listed by Dpvis rre, "Avoiding responsibility:
the philosophy of do-the-least
. . .
The Buck Passing pattern.
. .
"
"Legalism; The phychology of affirm-^nd-comform. . . The play it safe
attitude toward the naval career. Regulation becomes a sacred cow."
In addition, I e states, "If Regulation is the sacred cow of the
25
militar system, ritual is its golden calf." Some of Davis 1 obser-
vations may have been true during World War II; however, it i s
doubtful if such actions would be allowed to persist very long today
25
Arthur K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officers




without official action being taken. Apparently, no one has
attempted to tell Mr, Dubin that the information is a little
out of date, and students of sociology go on reading Davis'
views •
rIES
Movies are the last of the mass media 'which I have men-
tioned. Since rtany movies have been adapted Trom the war novels
mentioned and others which were not, the same comments with re-
gi rd to them apply. Of course there are other movies which have
scripts which were written solely for the production. Prestige
is both raised and lowered by movies and it is difficult to an-
alyze unless one has seen all applicable movies. At least when
a movie is made with the cooperation of the department of Defense
and/or the Department of the Navy, an officer is assigned as tech-
nical advisor. It becomes the duty of the technical advisor to
insure that the production will be in conformity with rood taste.
The naval officer can take a certain amount of chiding as long
as it is not too vicious.
FACE TO FACE
Not to be overlooked in the formulation of the public's opin-
ion of naval officers is the method which should be most obvious
28

but one to -which little thought is ,-iven. This is the method of
face to face communication. Several of the reference books have
indicated that the military is an isolsted group of individuals
who come into little contact with the civilian world* In today's
world, nothing could be further from the truth. In the Navy es-
pecially, government furnished quarters and housing projects have
failed miserably to keep pace with the expanded forces which have
come into existence since World War II. It is only natural that
many of our social contacts are with others of our own service,
but this is simply human nature and can be found with the members
of almost any large industrial organization. However, the mere
f • ct that we must seek housing for our families off the base, if
there is such a base, means that we are living amongst civilians.
The first time the writer has ever b°en assigned to public quarters
is at his present duty station r nd this was after hpving been com-
missioned, rnd married, for over 15 years. There are some officers
of the rank of commander who have never been assigned to public
quarters and without a doubt, even a few captains. It is while we
are living within the confines of the civilian vrorld that we are
able to influence public opinion, rood or bad, of the way of life
of the n^val officer. There are many officers today who are doing
more than their fair share in establishing good community relntions
through active participation in the many facets of public and com-
29

munity service, such as PTA, Boy Scouts, Little League, Toast-
masters, Home owners froups, etc. And let us not forget the
part our vdves pla; ; in establishing neighborhood contacts and
in their volunteer work in the community. All these, then, are
the r,r^ss roots of public opinion and ye do hnve excellent





With public opinion as it is, what, then, is the self-imafe
of the naval officer? Are we not looked down upon by a public
who is convinced that we are unable to m°ke a living in the civil-
ian world? Will we not have more prestige when we accept retire-
ment gracefully, whether we want it or not at the time, and step
into a new career as b teacher in the public school? Are we not
continously vilified by some Members of Congress, especially dur-
ing the appropriations hearings? 9 As we advance in rank do we not
find that the privileges which once were granted to the rank to
which we now identify ourselves h^ve been rescinded or possibly ad-
vanced just one more rank ahead? Unfortunately, it apoears that
the answers to all of these questions is, "Yes." As I have said
previously, I feel that the prestige of the naval officer is in
a period of ascendancy, but this does not prove that it is high.
It is pertinent to this study to note at this particular time
that I had thoroughly intended to enter with a basic premise that
officer prestipe was quite high at this time. After much research,
I was compelled to change that hypothesis to one which says merely
that prestige is in a period of ascendancy, and that positive and
determined steps must be taken to prevent its future decline. I am
not selling; the professional Career naval officer short. I find it
31

necessarj'' to concur fully with Jano\\ritz that, "every profession
assigns to itself a hirher status than outsiders would be willing
to concede, and every leadership group h"S a self-image which
f^ils to correspond to the imi:^e the public holds. Yet the
'crisis' in the military profession is as much a crisis in self-
esteem and self-ima^e ?s it is a crisis in organization and pur-
26
pose." One of the most revealing articles I have ever rerd
' ch concerns the self-im^re of the naval officer was written
27
by a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel just five years ago.
Many of ""he examples he gave have stuck in my mind these few
years and it is evident thnt his article did some good. But not
enough of his recommendations h°ve been carried out. The main
theme of his writings was that the special trust pnd confidence
which wo once enjoyed, w ! ich we once were riven with our accept-
ance of a commission, has diminished to a low point. In speaking
of this lowering of officer trust and confidence, LTCOL Heinl
states,
It is simply this: an alarming erosion of the status,
privilege, and confidence heretofore reposed in the officer
corps has taken place under our very eyes. This erosion h^s
awakened widespread complaint, frustration, and even bitter-
ness, among officers who have served any length of time. It
has unquestionably di scour n red likely young men of hip-h cal-
iber from becoming regular officers. By leveling out dis-
26




R.D. Heinl, Jr., LTCOL, USMC, "Special Trust and Confid-
ence," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1956.
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tinctions between officers and enlisted men, it has im-
posed serious handicaps on leadership of the most effec-
tive quality."28
In speaking of the self-imare of the naval officer it is
necessary to make a distinction between the several ranks. It
is onlv natural that the self-image of the admiral will be much
higher than the newly commissioned ensign, yet in recognizing
this distinction, the ensign does it with a sense of humor. Plow
many times have we all Joined in a chorus of, "Oh, the officers
ride in their motorboat, the admiral, he rides in his barge, it
don't go a goddamn bit faster, cut it makes the old feel
large"? Prestige? You bet it is, and more uower to him, if he
is a seagoing type of admiral.
The mirror in which the naval officer views his image is
constantly being steamed up by hot air from all quarters. He
has long since been used to such overworked platitudes as, inter-
service rivalry, Pentagon red tape, duplication of effort, bureau-
cratic thinking, military mind, waste ^nd inefficiency, mis-use
of manpower, wasteful spending, abuse of privileges, ceremonial
splendor, military discipline, authoritarian or autocratic action,
and the like. All of the foregoing make eve-catching headlines




glasses. To say that we don't have any of these would be un-
true, however, none of them pre so widesnread that they should
be damning to us as a group. They are the cliches, the tools
of the trade of the mas a communication media.
One of the virtues of the naval officer is a high sense of
honor. ilhen this honor becomes strained, for the several reasons
3 already been stated and several more yet to be brought
forth, is when prestige begins to slip r.nd the self-image becomes
blurred. As Janowitz puts it,
In a democratic society it is highly inappropriate
for honor to be the sole, or even dominrnt, value of the
professional military cadre. Honor comes to be combined
with and dependent upon public prestige and popular rec-
ognition. The military must be afforded sufficient pres-
tige and respect to insure a sense of self-esteem. But
the rank and file professionals, pnd even mrny members of
the elite, pre not certain that this is evidenced in the
attitudes of non-military society. Whether, in fact, the
officer behaves rs a heroic fifhter or as a milit"ry manner,
the anomalous oosition of the mil- professional in
American social structure has literally deprived him -of
a consistent self-im,«n;e. Even the most ^ssult-minded
officer does not consider himself a gunman; he wants to
be esteemed for his patriotism, public service, end judge-
t. The 'cold v; : s only served to further fracture
military self-esteem. It is . . • true that military
leaders hsve come to figure more prominently in public
life. However, there hrs been no general rise in the pres-
tige recorded the military officer; nor has there been any
greater willingness among young people to take on the re-
sponsibilities of military service. 29
29
Janowitz, op_. cit., pp. 225-2:6.
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Once prain we find that Janowitz is in disagreement with
Mills and his conception of the power elite, for Fills hns
riven prestige to the military elite because of -ho power of
30
the job in this unsetted world.
In his article, "Special Trust ^nd Confidence," Lieutenant
Colonel Heinl, Jr. cites the reasons why he feels that the
attitude toward fend within the corps of officers has deteri-
orated:
(1; Egalitarianism on !he nation?! scene.
(2) Continuing larp-e size of the Armed Forces.
(3) Lower caliber r>nd easygoing indoctrination of young
officers.
(4) Tendency of administrative thickheadedness to override
individual discretion pnd common sense.
(5) Side effects of the Universal Code of Military Justice.
(6) Genernl relaxation of officer discipline and officer
self-discipline.
Although LTCOL Heinl wrote these words in 1956, most of the
reasons still apply today. If any of the reasons have been de-
creased, probably the fourth and six are the ones. I would say
that the current leadership program hns assisted to make these
decreases.
30







Another avenue of self-image, one which can become a rough
road of conversation among officers, is the alleged difference
between the Naval Academy graduate ?.nd the non-graduate. Recent
selection bonrds for the higher ranks, CDR through RADM, seem
to select a majority of academy graduates. A more accurate
statement is that when separated by groups, the attrition among
academy graduates percentage-wise is less than that for each
other group such as USNTs, augmented former reserves, etc. I
refuse to believe that this is a result of the fact that academy
officers are on the bosrds. As a matter of fact, I know that
selection boards are not comprised only of academy graduates.
Selection boards which convene to select rear admirals obviously
have the highest percentage of academy graduates on them simply
because most of our admirals are graduntes. Having served as a
recorder on a selection board, and having several friends who rlso
served in that capacity during my recent tour in BuPers, it was
discovered that when the reviews of the officers* official re-
cords were m^de by the members of the board, no attempt was made to
give specific groups of records to any specific member. This merns
that the academy graduate could have his record reviewed by any
member of the bo^rd. The onlv distinction made was by designators.
There are many facets which enter into the selection process
pnd it is a well known fact by now that each selection board has
36

its o-wn specific criteria -which they use in making the determina-
tion of who will be selected. To mention a fewj age and physi-
cal condition, amount of education and whether or not a degree
was awarded, duties and billets, various information in the selec-
32
tion bo^rd jacket, and lastly, but most important, the fitness
report jacket. Janowitz makes the bland statement, "But when all
other factors are in balance, the service nc^demy graduate has the
33
advantage." He does not corroborate this statement. The point
here is that it would be easy to say that the self-image of the
non-academy graduate is lower than that of the graduate. In a
survey m-de by a student at the "Navy Management School at Monterey,
California in March pnd April, 1961, in which 1000 questionaires
were sent out to officers with about three years' service or less,
to the midshipmen of the Naval Academy and the NROTC units of two
universities, and to officers candidates, one of the questions was;
"In my opinion, the general civilian populace holds a naval officer
in:" The results are tabulated below.
Officers who say they Undecided Civilian
are career oriented career-wise oriented
Extremely High Prestige 37
Above Average " 108
Average " 24





32 See Bu Pers Manual, Article B-2201 (l) (b) for further in-
formation regarding contents of the selection board jacket.
33
Janowitz, op. cit., p. 137.
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In tabulating his results, the author stated that he was sur-
prised to find that more naval academy graduates checked the middle
two categories, ebove average and average, whereas reserve officers
34
md former reserve officers tended to mark the first tv;o categories.
bh all the evidence appearing to stack up for the self-image
of mediocre prestige, I think it important to state that there are
some who look upon the status of the naval officer as quite high.
These are the officers who feel a deep sense of personal honor and
integrity as an officer and a gentleman, r ith or without the often
quoted, "by act of Congress." These are officers who feel that an-
other of our virtues is the ability to lead, in spite of the events
which brought forth General Order 21. These ore the officers \vho
believe in seapo'rer as an absolute necessity if we are to protect
the security of our nation ind that we are, in a way, standard bear-
ers. These officers can rationalize that their lack of personal
fortunes, which pre a usual measure of prestige, is made up for by
oersonal sacrifices and that they should be respected by the public
for their part in national security. This quest for respect, they
like to believe, makes it so.
Each naval officer has his own self-image which is a general-
ized thing. He ^lso finds that the general feeling is subject to
34
LCDR F. . . od-orth, SC, USN, "The Career 'decision,"
Management School Research Paper, 18 May 1961.
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daily events which act to increase or decrease the size of the
image. A newspaper prticle, Congressional action, a contact
with the civilian world, an occurrence in his command, a bureau
instruction, a movie, novel or TV program can each act to sway




TEE FORCES WHICH ACT AGAINST PRESTIGE
To this point we have looked at prestire in a clinical
way in an attempt to build empirical evidence of its current
status. Let us now turn to some specifics and provoke thought
about the forces which pet to deflate or destroy both the pub-
lic viewpoint and the self-image. These pre the factors, the r -
curring type and the every dny variety, which inhibit the Armed
Forces in their qu«st for better officers. These are the fact-
ors which must be pltered or supr,essed if our Armed Forces ere
to remain strong and to develop through the years, so that they
will be able to perform whatever missions mi<rht be assigned to
them in the future. Somewhere I have read that, "the CNO f_or
whatever he may come to be called"! of twenty years from now is
35
somewhere a lieutenant in today's Navy." Where is the young
man who will be our top naval leader thirty years from today?
THE CONGRESS
What better place to start with specifics than with the power
of the people. "Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To.
. .
provide for the common Defence
J"
Sicf] and general Welfare of the





Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval
,,36
Forces. These quotations emphasize the civilian control
over the military through Congressional control of the purse
strings. Most naval officers will agree, almost without reser-
vation, that the bpsic <n. historicpl concept of civilian control
is necessary to the continuing greetness of the nation. The
frustration which is caused by the pressure groups within the
Congress, groups which delight in taking pot shots at a service
which is rival to their cause or groups which "re ever striving
to reduce the privileges and benefits of the military, does little
to produce service prestige or unity. Janowitz claims that, " A
few conspicuous civilian lepders [" such as Carl Vinson and Richard
B. Russell"! are seen as heroes, but the military shares the civil-
ian image that politicians are an unworthy lot. . . There is little
appreciation of the fact that a political democracy requires com-
37
peting pressures." On this same subject, Bines has noted,
Congress has been vocpI about service disunity and
there has been, in fact, considerable difference of opin-
ion among the services. Conp-ress, however, is less vocal
about its contribution to the disunity. The fundamental
causes of the disunite are the budgetary process and the
fact that the missions assigned to the individual military
departments have become competitive rather than complement-
ary. 38
36
The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8,
37
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It is usually during the budgetary process before the appro-
priations committees that the representatives of the various pres-
sure groups in Congress go to work on the military lenders. "Not
only must the professional officer endure the criticism, but he
must watch personal [j3i cJ legislation interfere with officer
quality ^nd thus nssure the existence of more material for cri-
39
ticism." The same criticism seems to go on whenever legislation
is introduced in Congress which pertains to benefits for the Armed
Forces, whether it be nay, housing, retirement, etc.
Another method of breeding frustration md contempt is prac-
ticed by the very few. This is the sensationalism approach which
some Congressmen use to enhance their own position in Congress by
the expose of certain practices, policies, and personnel. Those are
the torch-bearers, the crusaders nnd the champions of the underdog.
In the absence of policy differences of consequences
between the major oarties, the professional party politician
must invent themes about which to talk . • • since Vforld "Jar
II, among frustrated politicians there has come into wider
use the accusation ^nd impugnment of character — of opponents
^s well is of innocent neutrals ... Hunting headlines in
this context, with less patronage and without big enraging
issues, some Congressmen find the way to temporary success, or
at lerst to public attention, in the universalization of dis-
trust.40
Representatives of the mass media Treep a close listening
ear to the public utterances of Ccnrressmen and whenever sensation-
39Ibid\
40
C. VJright Mills, The Power Elite, p. 257.

al charges pre m^de, and printed, some people listen and are im-
pressed. I need mention only a few subjects to clarify this
point: Air Force Manuals, Enlisted Servants, Naval Weapons Plant,
and of course we could go back to a few of the cliches which were
41
mentioned previously.
It would be possible to go on and on to shov how Congress has
lowered the prestige of the naval officer through investigations,
hearings and legislation. Some will be mentioned under other
specific headings later. One which should be mentioned before
proceeding- further concerns snch platitudes as waste °nd ineffi-
ciency. The Congress, as a body, is forever trying to get the
military to close installations which are claimed to have outlived
their usefulness and, as a result, are a drain on the public's
pocketbook. But what happens whenever a military department or the
Department of Defense attempts to do just that? Immediately Con-
gressmen who have ': loc-1 interest are up in arms because it v.d.11
mean a loss of jobs for their constituents. Even the most voci-
ferous advocates of economy "n:i efficiency back dovn a little and
say, "Close them down--but not in my neck of the woods." It would
be interesting to re^d a few of the Congressional inquiries which
have been made of the Executive Departments as a result of Secretary
McNamara's recent cutback of installations.
41
See page f 34

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President
has indisputable power over the services. This does not mem
that he can be vdthout fpult. However, v.rhen m executive order
emanates from the White House, what more can the Naval officer do
but counter with a cheery, "Aye aye, Sir"? One of these orders
did much during the l^st days in office of President Eisenhower
to decrease the prestige of all military men. The headline,
"Ike Orders Return of Dependents," which appeared in many papers,
shocked the military from top ta. bottom. I think the most im-
portant facet of this order was the apparent reduction of the
military man to the status of second clrss citizen, since noth-
ing was mentioned about other U.S. citizens abroad. Former
Secretary of Defense Grtes said, as quoted in the IJpyy Times
,
"our people are accustomed to sacrifice and traditionally military
42
men hsve been separated from their families for long periods."
Had the following statement been made at the same time, prestige
would have orobably snowballed, downhill," ... new Navy Secre-
tary John B. Connally frankly admitted his nagging concern: ' I was
surprised to find that the average j_emphasis supplied^ Navy man on
43
sea duty gets to see his family about 00 days out of the year. 1 "
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44

"When the order in question was finally rescinded, the Navy rained
some prestige by the very fret that the plight of the serviceman
overseas had been publicized and the Navy had done little criticiz-
ing of the order.
The new administration is off to a fairly good start, but not
"without a critic or two along the way. The Army-Navy-Air Force
Journal took a few pot shots at the .Vhite House and asked Secretary
McNamara to stop, "what appears to be the start of an open season,"
on the prestige of military officers. One of the items citod the
disapproval of a $200,000 addition to an officers' club near Paris,
a
The Journal said, "There is no question that President Kennedy has
compl'jte authority to stop such a project, but there is much room
to question the mariner in which Ylhite House Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger made the decision known.
. .
If Mr. Salinger's objective
was to capture headlines, he succeeded." It went on to suggest, in
effect, that if -.-he usual Dep^rt^ent of Defense channels had been
utilized, "such a procedure would have accomplished every objective
44
except one: It would have made no headlines." In reference to
the same article, "The marazine °lso criticized the manner in which
Maj. Gen. Raymond E. Bell, chairman of the U.S. -Brazilian Military
Commission, and Adm. Arleigh A, Burke, Chief of Naval operations,
44







Sic_] were criticized in public instead of in private."
These are but a few examples, pnd I c?n not help but wonder
if they are part of a plan on the part of vhe new administration
to drive the services together by reverse psychology. This would
be a better trick than creating a separate Department of the Air
Force in hopes of achieving the complete unification of the Armed
Forces.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"Where Congress has indirect civilian control of the military,
the Depprtment of Defense, as an executive department, has direct
control. The personality of bhe Secretary of Defense plays an
important part in the prestige pattern of the services. A weak
or ineffective SecDef , as well as one who is hirh-handed pnd too
powerful, opens himself, and the services which he administers, to
public criticism. That it is difficult to attract and retain top-
flirht civilian executives in this job was recognized by the Hoover
Commission. This commission also noted, "For various reasons, tenure
in the Secretaript is too short to provide the leadership and civil-
ian control which our system of government requires. The tenure of
presidential appointees in the Department of Defense and the prede-
cessor departments, during the past ten years has averaged less than
45
"Barbs at TOiite House Reflect 'Open Season on Military Officer




eighteen months." Without the proper continuity in office of
our top-level civilian officials, especially those who leave
office before a change of administration, how can prestige but
suffer? In connection with this office, one of the factors which
lowers its prestige, and consequently the prestige of the services
is the requirement that the appointee divest himself of all in-
terests which might influence his rctions while in office. This
lack of trust on the p^rt of Conrress is not in the best interests
of the nation. If such a person were to betray the public trust
placed in him, there are many ways in which he could be mr.de to
pay. As it stands now, the Senate confirms such an appointment
after saying, "We will trust you only after you have given up your
other interests." While on this particular subject, this require-
ment may have -=cted in frvor of Secretary McNamara since he found
it necessary to decree that servicemen could no longer buy foreign
automobiles tax-free, ship them home at government expense and im-
port them duty free. What a clamor might have been made if he 1
not divested himself of Ford holdings.
There are many policies and orders which emanp.te from the
office of SecDef . It has been said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have been by-passed in recent weeks. It is not possible at this
time to determine the truth of this claim, but if such a prpctice
is going on in the Pentagon, service prestige is in for a big blow.
46 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in
the Department of Defense, Jun 1955, p. 10.
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Some of the specific policies which will be brought out in the
next section undoubtedly originate in the office of SecDef, hew-
ever, since it is up to the Department of the Navy to implement
them they will come under its heading.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
In addition to policies and regulations which come from the
executive branch of the Government, some of the following items
will be recognizable as Congressional legislation. As pointed out
much earlier, the factors which influence prestige are closely re-
lated f-nd blend into the spectrum. Let us now look ot some of
these factors item by item. It will be noted in some of the fact-
ors which will be discussed that we are, in fact, our own worse enemy.
PAY
It has been said that naval officers will never become
wealthy unless they marry money, inherit money, hpve an outside
income or write a book. Each naval officer knew th^t service pay
a not the best when he made his career decision. However, not
many of them felt that service pay would be allowed to fall behind
the salaries paid to comparable civilian pursuits, especially in
the higher ranks. If inflation did not keep cutting into the pur-
chasing power of the dollar and if pressure groups were less suc-
cessful in influencing Congress concerning the so-called "fringe
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benefits," I doubt that there would be much clamor about pay
raises. After all, longevity pay raises are made every two years
in most cases
•
Senator Stennis had some interesting remarks to make when
he introduced the Military Pay Act of 1958 on the floor of the
Senate
.
I believe that the bill, if enrcted, would ro a long
way toward meeting the problems of retaining men in the
service, to round out a military career. However, I think
we should emphasize the fact that a real military career is
also based, at least partly, on a sense of service, a sense
of mission, a sense of pride in being in the service and
wearing the uniform of the particular branch to which
person belongs.
,
l.liam H. Bines also had some interesting things to say
about the same pay bill. "Legislative vision, apparently ob-
scured by the mist, determined that there was no retention pro-
blem amon;; generals and odmirals, but no career officer missed
the point—the potential leader is provided with little monetary
47
incentive." It is true that money can not buy prestige, but
it certainly helps. Fortunately the credit rating of naval offi-
cers is very high and we can buy the symbols of strtus on time,
as does a large percentage of the remainder of our population.
But this is not a plea for an increase in base pay at this time.
It is a plea that if one is proposed in the. future, it will re-
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cognize the responsibility of higher rank and pay for it. Also,
since a pay raise usually acts to bring servicemen up to date at
the particular time that it is enacted, only to start falling be-
hind apain, it is hoped that if one comes it will be geared to
the cost of living in some way to prevent tine lag,
ALLOWANCES
Of the several allowances which are given to navy men, the
only one which I will comment upon is the quarters allowance. When
the Military Pay Bill of 1958 v/?s passed by Congress, no increase
in the quarters allowance wipe mrde. In f^ct, no increase has been
msde in the quarters allowance since May, 1952. Ho one needs to be
told how rentals and utilities have increased since that time. 3ven
if the tax free advantage of the quarters allowance is taken into
consideration, wherein the actual cash value wovld increase anproxi-
mately twenty percent, it is rare to find a naval officer who is able
to obtain suitable quarters and stay within the allowance received.
There is no definition of suitable civilian quarters. If there were
one, it would be necessary to consider the number of dependents. The
quarters allowance for officers makes no distinction for the number
of dependents of the officer concerned. As mentioned previously,
the self-imp re of any profession is higher than outsiders would
concede. Is it not true, therefore, that most of us attempt to
find living accomodations which are just a little richer than our
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pocketbooks can afford? If we were determined to stay within
the allowance received, especially in cities where there is a
high concentration of military, we would h^ve to live in com-
paratively low rent districts. Naturally, the more dependents,
the more bedrooms ^re required and the price goes up. The
quarters allowance does not make any distinction as to where
the officer is pssignad duty. If unfortunate enough to be sent
to a high cost of living in the continental United States, the
naval officer, in effect, takes a substantial cut in pay.
PUBLIC .QUART
An allied subject of the quarters allowance is public
quarters. In a recent article, the Army-li'avy-Air Force Journal
stated,
It will probably never be possible or desirable to
provide Government housing for all military personnel.
Therefore, it is imperative that adequate allowances be
authorized for the larger percentage of our people who
cannot be provided public quarters. The world wide
deficit in available housing and the current inadequate
allowances forces our personnel to reduce their standard
of livinr or exist 'so marginally n s to live in rn rt-
mosphere of constant financial tension. Failure to pro-
vide either the housing or reasonable and adequate allow-
ances will negate other efforts to improve the retention
of required ski lis. 4°
While there is no announced policy for establishing the
adequacy of civilian housing, there are guidelines concerning
48
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the size of units which ^re built as Gapehart Housing or public
quarters. The allowable square feet can be translated into a
number of bedrooms and from this into the rark or ranks for which
it is applicable. It would be assumed from this that the higher
the rank, the larger the quarters. However, when public quarters
are assigned act installations where there pre quarters available
for officers who are not a part of the command structure of the
base, consideration is often given to the number of dependents
involved. Officers with larger families are given larger quarters,
in spite of the fact th?t their ranks may be lower. This is incom-
patible 7"ith both the amount of 'the quarters allowance and the fact
that the quarters allowance does not take into consideration the
number of dependents. In situations of this kind, the privilege
of the more senior of leer is being disregarded. This situation
seems to occur only to commanders and below. It is a policy based
upon virility, not seniority.
The administration of public quarters is a headache and a
mess, as almost any officer who is concerned therewith cr-n nttest.
As the result of a lack of empathy "nd other factors, which are
caused by a centralization of policies in the Bureau of Yards and
Docks, many residents of public quarters are made to feel that they
?re second olaBS citizens. Here art the Llaval Postgraduate School,
there is a decided difference in the manner in which a commander
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living on the school grounds and one living in La Mesa Village
[formerly Capehart Housing^ are treated, yet each gives up ex-
actly the same quarters allowance. Units in La Mesa are inferior
to the homes located on the grounds , Commander students in La
Mesa are responsible for cutting and weeding their own lawns,
while on the grounds the commpnders have their lawns crrefully
manicured by Public Works* If not cared for at La Mesa to the
satisfaction of the civilian housing manager, the commander re-
ceives a written memo signed by the civilian housing manager.
Garbage collection is a rather minor point, but goes a long way
to point out the differences. Ca Mesa residents are authorized
to fill only two garbage cans a week for a weekly pickup, whereas
the residents on the school grounds are authorized to fill three
garbage c^ns and hr>ve a bi-weekly pickup. If we nre to be con-
cerned with prestige, we might start right at the bottom with the
garbage cnn.
Lieutenant Colonel Heinl brought up the question of grass
49
cutting. This paper is not a request that all naval officers,
regardless of rank, have their grass cut at the taxpayers' e
pense. However, isn't this time consuming triviality a pres'
factor? The answer to this will probably be conditioned by
whether I am referring to an rdmirpl or a captain — or even a
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R.D. Heinl, Jr., LTCOL, USMC, "Special Trust and Confidence,"




It might be a worthwhile move to place the operation of
public quarters at each installation under a system similar to
the Industrial Fund concept. This would remove the construction,
maintenance and repair of public quarters i'rom the budgetary pro-
cess and preclude use of the time worn phrase, "We just don' t have
the funds to do that." It is possible that if they were put on a
paying basis the profits could be reverted to improvements of
buildings and services.
There have been many insstances where the adequacy of public
quarters, as far as the type and condition, has served to act
ainst officer prestige. An example of this occurred in the early
1950s on Guam. Officers were allowed to tear down, move and re-
build quonset huts for use as housing for their families. The
quonsets were free but the labor was the responsibility of each
officer. After the project had been completed, the Navy turned a-
round and collected their quarters allowances. There have been many
cases where dilapidated quonset huts have been considered adequate *
quarters. It is doubtful that anyone making such a determination
was living in one of them at the time.
Lastly, the question of quantity. Rarely does one ever find
enough housinp- units to go around at any naval installation. For
y
some reason, the Army and Air Force fare much better in this regard.
This is particularly a sore subject at overseas duty stations where,
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as a result, it is at tines not possible to travel concurrently
with dependents. In some cases, the waiting period before de-
pendents are al loved to travel is six months to a yerr. This
is an anti-morale factor and, consequently, also anti-prestige.
COMMISSAR]
Our commissary stores have been under the constant fire of
Conrress ever since World War II through the incessant din of the
chain store pressure groups. The Hoover Commission attacked them
as comoeting with private business, '^specially in large metropol-
itan areas such as Washington, D.C. It must be true that commis-
saries do undersell the large c-rocery chains. If they did not,
would one find t' e long queues waiting to get into the commissaries
or to check out through the registers? It h-s been said that, on the
average, if $100 were spent in a commissary, it would take $123 to
purchase the same list of groceries at one of the competitive chain
stores. Of course this would not be completely true if service wives
shopped for the loss leaders or took advantage of the week-end sales.
Not all service wives shop at the commissaries. Host wives that do,
either live on the bnse or close to the commissaries or are owners of
a deepfreeze.
Commissaries at remote installations or at overseas bases
usually do not come under fire of Congress since thejr are consid-
ered to be in compliance with the intent of Congress in the author-
izations of commissaries. However, in a way, commissaries can be
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likened to the quarters allowance situation. This is especinlly
true in some high cost of living areas in which there are no com-
missaries. In these areas, the personnel assigned suffer a cut in
pay.
As mentioned in the Hoover Commission report, the grocery
chain business is highly competitive. If commissaries were closed
at non-remote locations, these chains, whiah actually ,?re in finer
competition ps a result of commissaries, would feel free to raise
prices. If this happened, the civilian populace would feel the
effect as much ps the military.
It should be realized by now that the writer considers any
action which results in pn effective reduction in pay to be con-
trary to the raising of prestige.
NAVY EXCHANGES
Those who hav^ been in the naval service since before the
st.prt of World War II hpve seen the Navy Exchange deteriorate
from an operation through which one could buy anything from a
toothbrush to a new automobile at a reduced price, to a highly
restricted variety store. Many officers also remember that when
they n-^de a choice o>° he Navy as a career that this was one of
the many advantages (now called fringe benefits) which wafl rointed
out. However, ps pnother result of pressure groups, which have




identification to prove a distorted viewpoint, the exchangee
have been vilified and relegated to selling; items which cost less
than a certain dollar value. An ironical twist has taken place as
a direct result of the foregoing pressure groups. We find that in
many locations where there is c high concentration of the military,
discount houses pre now flourishing. Such civilian owned and oper-
ated stores as GEM in the Washington, D.C. area, AGE in xhe Vallojo
and Alameda area, and many others in various parts of the country
cater not only to the military, but also to any employees of the
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federal, state, county and municipal governments. These same
pressure groups are now smarting under their loss of business to
these discount houses and are putting more and more ores sure on the
Congress for the enactment of Fair Trade legislation. In these areas,
it makes a very small financial difference whether the military pop-
ulation shop at exchanges or discount houses, since most of the prices
for items which can be purchased in the exchanges are comparable in
the discount houses.
As with the commissaries and public quarters, there are many
Navy personnel stationed at places where these fringe benefits do not
exist.
Each member of the naval service is indoctrinated that the




items which are purchased in he navy exchange are solely for
his own personal use, the use of his immediate family or for use
as a bona fide gift* However, when a purchase is made which
amounts to more then $5.00 it is required that the service mem-
ber or his dependent sign an affidavit indicating who will use
the article. The penalty for misuse is loss of exchange priv-
ileges . Such a procedure for a member of the service, especially
for a naval officer, indicates a lack of trust and acts to lower \s
prestipe. If a naval officer abuses this privilege, then by all
means take administrative action against him. On the other hand,
the officer should be trusted and not suspected at the time of the
purchase.
The Hoover Commission recommended that "Consideration should
(__NavyJbe given to operating Post | Exchanges by private contractors
51
on a concession basis." The Navy Exchange has been recognized
as a fringe benefit for many years because it sells merchandise
at a reduced price. It is also recognized ^s a convenience, es-
pecially for those who are living aboard the station on which it
is located. The -"Titer feels that if the operation of Navy Ex-
changes were turned over to civilian interests on a concession
basis the first advantage would be completely wiped out. They could
51
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be operated differently, with better efficiency end better
service then they now experience. The apparent monopoly
which they now enjoy tends to make them somewhat apathetic
towprd their customers. I would like to see a corporation
of retired officers and men take over the operation of the
navy exch^nres and commissaries, for there is much talent
to be had from our retired ranks with past experience in
these fields. In addition, such an operation would certain-
ly assist in supplementing the retired pay of those persons
involved. As a concessionaire, this corporation would be
entirely removed from regulation by Gonpress. A fringe bene-
fit would be restored and prestige could be enhanced.
MEDICARE AND MEDICAL CARE
A few platitudes seem to be in order at this point. The
primary mission of the medical department is to provide cere
to active duty personnel. If you ere goinc; to be sick, find
out the hours of sick call. There is en acute shortage of doc-
tors in the naval service. Have a seat over there and wait
—
and wait— and wait. These ere but a few of the medical tru-
isms -we he^r throughout our careers. There are many more.
Similer to the stories which were said to be told by return-
ing veterans about officers in an earlier chapter, almost every
serviceman end his wife can -ell one equally as good about the
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treatment experienced at the hands of a member of the medical
department.
At least once a year each officer goes through the pro-
duction line, a procedure which is often referred to as an
annual physical examination. Since it is necessary to make an
appointment for the examination, it must be knovn that you are
coming. As a matter of fact, one usually is told to report no
later than 0800 hours. To go into the rrmny details of the wait-
ing lines which are experienced would be wasteful. The point is
this: The attitude which prevails is that these medical people
are doing the officer a huge favor. An officer's time is much
more important to the Navy than a corpsman's, at such a time,
and in many cases more important than that of a junior medical
officer. There are times other than during annual physical exam-
inations when the sitting and waiting routine occurs.
But what about dependent medical care? I have always im-
pressed upon the civilian members of my family that they do not
wear my rank. Therefore, when they find it necessary to seek
medical treatment or advice, it is expected that they will be
treated equally with the other civilian dependents. This is
not always done ^s "nyone can attest. At times, the treatment
is too equal. A good example of this is when all pre-natal
appointments are made for the exact same time, and the ladies
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find it necessrry to jockey for position to get to see the
doctor. Of course, some clinics have solved this problem
by providing a first in, first out -rr^nrement. I ^m not
suggesting that the treatment of my dependents lowers my
prestige by virtue of my rank. What I am suggesting is that
the treatment accorded to all dependents lowers the prestige /
of all ranks.
1
.'7hen the Medicare program w^s effected, I hoped that the
orestire factor would be but one of the ^any problems it would
solve. It has not, and we have all seen how it has become a
political football which is kicked rround by the Congress, the
American Medical Association, and the Armed Forces.
In an article in the Navy Times, John J, Ford stated,
"The Navy estimates it costs $102 for a full year for the
medical care cost for a man ^nd his dependents. This is what
the total medical cpre bill averages out to: the navy doesn't
52
necessarily spend that much on each m^n." It cm only be
assumed that this means the total amount is based upon the
cost of medical crre for the serviceman ^nd his dependents
at service facilities rs well as the costs of the Medicare
Program. If this assumption is correct, it is suggested that
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a special study be made of the entire medical program in the
Armed Forces to determine the feasibility of plpcinr all de-
pendents under a health insurance program similar to Blue Cross
and Blue Shield . It is not the intent of this suggestion to re-
duce, in any way , the medical benefits which are now available
to the dependents of military personnel nor to increase the
costs, in any way, to the serviceman. If the price tag is $102
per man today, think of what it would save the services in pay
and allowances by reducing the number of doctors, in the cost
of facilities which would not be needed, in the cost of drusrs
which would not have to be furnished. There would probably be
enough saving that dental care could be provided under the same
arrangement. As a side result, it is felt that the prestige of
every man in the service would be raised for there would be a
less benevolent attitude on the part of everyone concerned.
OFFICER PERFORMANCE
A recent two year tour in the Officer Performance Division
of the Bureau of Naval Personnel taught the writer many lessons
about officer performance, or, as we used to call it, officer
mal-performance. One of these lessons is that there "re a very
few officers who do immeasurable harm to the reputation of the J
many. Our best satistics indicted that there was less than
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one-half of one nercent of the officers who could be placed in
the -mal-performance category • This must be considered ns an
excellent control since the quality con'rol of mats production
standards, are lower than this. Included in this low percent-
age were officers who were the victims of various kinds of acci-
dents and who suffered the oains of administrative pvuai shment,
in spite of the dedicated lives which they had led. This group
is not being referred to, nor is the obvious mis-fit who ; s re-
leased early if discovered.
The group with which I am concerned is composed of the offi-
cers who have evidenced intent in their actions which have broupht
discredit unon the naval service. This group contains the dis-
honest, the alcoholic, the homosexual, the b~d debt or bad check
artist, the martinet, the rum-runner, the court order violator
and others. Unfortunately, this group is the last to core about
their fellow officers md the consequences of public ridicule
which effect e^ch one of us. It would not be prober in a pnper
of this kind to go into any details as some of the cases might
be too easily recc nized. Suffice it to say that too many in-
dividual cases were, in effect, kicked upstairs by both command-
ing officers ?nd their superiors when action could and should
have been taken at the command level. Of course, directives
from higher authority dictated TTrshington level action in some
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of the instances mentioned. It is the fervent hope of General
Order 21 that improved leadership will improve officer perform-
ance and reduce the one-half of one percent figure even more.
There is a group of officers who are at the precarious
position of being at the bottom of the "hump" who have exper-
ienced both feast and famine. At the very end of ;.Torld War II,
these officers were catapulted into positions of higher res-
sponsibility because mmy reserve officers senior to them v:ere
getting out of the nary upon the accumlation of the required
number of points. However, at the same time, the number of
shios and squadrons remained constant. For lack of numbers of
officers to fill the billets, these officers had to do the job.
But then came the reduction in she number of ships and squadrons.
In this situation, nnd with the "hump" problem, the Navy found
that it had too many officers in the higher ranks such as LCDR
end too few in the junior ranks, LGDRs were given the jobs
which vrould normally be assigned to LTs, and some LTs found
themselves also lowered in their responsibilities. Cne case in
point was a LT who had been personnel officer immediately follow-
ing VForld "Tar II in a pptrol squadron, as an ensign. Three Years
after Korea, as a lieutenant, he was again assigned as personnel
officer of a patrol squadron. Under similar circumstances, it
is little wonder that our junior officers find that the assign-
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ments which they are given are lrcking in responsibility. These
attitudes can be seen in the figures given previously on page 13 .
RETIRED PERSOiaJEL
There have been some fairly sensational headlines throughout
the country in the past few years as a result of the actions of
retired officers. Some of these retired officers have used the
title of Rear Admiral. A rabid segregationist is still making
the headlines, illegal liquor dealings have caught others, non-
support and indebtedness still others. Since these old sea dogs
-re frirly invulnerable to the UCMJ, although still subject to its
provisions, it is suggested that their retired or: cnization make
an effort to put their house in order. Whether an officer is re-
tired or not makes little difference to the press, as the word




WAVY ATTEMPTS TO Ii^ROVE PRESTIGE
As mentioned previously, the attempt to increase the pres-
tige of any group must come necessprily from within the group.
In an address before the Naval Postgraduate -School RADlvi Martel
stated thpt the new Secretary of the Navy is interested in es-
53
tablishing or raising the dignity of the naval officer. It is
hoped that his interest vail be pl?ced into a formal progrrm soon.
The first step to increase officer prestige --fter the Korean
liar oaira in 1954. This was the j*e-introduction of the sword. I
remember the day the order came out very well as I spent one hour
standing in line at the post of rice at Atsugi, Japan waiting to
buy a money order to send home to my dependents. Before my appli-
cation could be accepted by the enlisted postal clerk, regulations
stated that I had to obtain the signature of another naval officer
v
who knew me personally. The reason for this wns to prevent my
sending home black market money . Has the sword actually increased
the prestige of any officer who hrd to purchase one? I have seen
swords used for three things; Military inspections of regular
officers* forming arches at military weddings; and cutting cakes.
A recent attempt to increase prestige has been the recognition -^
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of those orficers in com-nand at sea. The idea of setting these
/
officex-s apart from the others is commendable. The device, the
oversize p-old star, is a poor choice and looks similar to a
"prop" from a TV western. This nsrticulnr facet of prestige is
tied to the st?>r as a symbol, but the same star is to be found
on the sleeve of the unrestricted line officer who is eligible
for command at sea. However, it is also on the sleeve of the re-
stricted line officer, the lawyer, the PIO, the Wave and others.
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I feel that Special Trust and Confidence did much to cancel
out some of the activities being carried on within commands which
detracted from prestige and I urge the reader to read or re-read
that article in order to prevent being our own worse enemy. Actions
by individual commands, therefore, assisted to raise prestige. Hun-
dreds of examples of prestige lowering regulrtions, actions, etc.
could be elicited if anyone ref lly cnred. I ask the reader to
think of just three, and what he has done or can do to correct the
situations. Two final quotations are in order.
Since World War II, in fact, the warlords have caused
a large—soale and intensive public-relations program to be
carried out. They have spent millions of dollars and they
have employed thousands of skilled publicists, in and out
of uniform, in order to sell their ideas and themselves to
the public and to the congress. [.Sic 3 The content of this





reality of international relations in a military way,
to portray the armed forces in a manner at~rrctive to
civilians
. . .
The aim is to build the prestige of the





Improving the recognition pnd Drestige of the
public service is not a mere public relations task.
It calls instead for more sustained and objective
attention to the virtues as v/ell as the deficiencies
of the public service by the President, Congress, the
leaders of the interest p-roups and of the communication
media, and the leaders of the educational system, ^6
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The spectrum of prestige is broad and includes many fact-
ors. Every naval officer intent on making the naval service a
life's •work expects to receive recognition for his efforts. He
desires to be respected and trusted. He seeks both self-confid-
ence nnd the confidence in his abilities as expressed by others.
He wants to live an honorable life, ,-nd hopes thnt through his
service nnd ~dv?nces in rank he will be given a position of
status md esteem; that he wil\ be placed in high social class
regardless of his origin.
As a consequence of this way of thinking, the career
officer abhors the attempt of any person or any group to deny
him such orestige. However, the prestige of n^val officers is
subject to a fluctuating cycle which, unfortunately, is geared
to the state of national security; high in war, low follovdng
war and an uphill battle from there.
Prestige is only one fector which influences career choice.
If younger officers and their younger civilian brothers see nr-val
officers held in high esteem by both the public pnd their older
officer brothers, the influence ill be positive rather than neg-
ative. I was reluctpnt to change my opinion concerning the present
status of nresti^e, for T felt it h?d been rising since a year or
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two after the Korean War. After much thought, I realized that
ray rank had also risen. My self-image of rising prestige was
not wholly a result of being a npval officer, it was tempered
by advances in rank. Therefore, I found it necessary to be
content with the evidence which seemed to prevail that officer-
ship was a relatively low status profession, but, nevertheless
ascending.
If prestip-e is ascending and if there are forces which
tend to lower it, then it follows lorically that positive steps
should be taken to assist the pscent and to resist the fall.
"What crn be done?
RECOMMENDATIONS
Prior to making any recommendations, I wish to emphasize
onemain point. This is not intended to be a "gripe" paper;
it is a study of officer prestige. It is natural that it in-
cludes some of the factors which detract from your prestige and
mine. It h^s not included all of the factors, for no one can
list them all. Nor has it included all of the examples which
came to mind or which were recommended by others. Some of tie
recommendations which were made or implied in the body of the
T)aper will not be included in my formal recommen Ttions, for
further repetition would serve no useful purpose. For example,
who can tell Congress or the Press to change their ways?
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If it is agreed that steps should be taken to improve
officer prestige, the following recommendations are offered
to the individual and to the applicable groups for guidance:
1. Each naval officer should become conscious of his
self-image and vow to:
a. Conduct himself in a manner, morally and pro- J
fessionally, which will not reflect discredit
on his officer status nor on the naval service.
b. Be conscious of his responsibilities to the com-
munity in wrhich he livas, whether it be civilian
or military.
c. Demand the privileges of his rank and authority,
without abusing the privileges or evading his
responsibilities. --
d. Require performance of his subordinates and in-
crease the responsibilities of those who prove
themselves capable whenever possible.
e. Realize that all naval officers are in the Navy
and to treat equals as equals, regardless of their
relationship to his own organization,
2. It is recommended that each com landing officer:
a. Re-appraise his method of reviewing and approving
the reports of fitness of his subordinates to give
the reviewing authorities an absolute and fair
picture of the officer concerned, regardless of his
background.
b. Conduct a survey of his command to uncover and correct
practices which are detrimental to officer prestige.
c. Be aware that ;he mis-use of men, money and material




3. The many bureaus ^nd offices of the N*vy Department
should re-affirm their understanding that officer
prestire is important to the procurement and re-
tention of 'naval officers m 1 take action to en-
hance prestige whenever possible. Some methods of
accomplishing this are:
a. Formulate n policy for the administration of Pub-
lic Quarters which will be more realistic with re-
gard to the adequacy thereof. There is no logical
reason why officers of different rank must pay
different amounts for identical auarters.
b. Uniform changes.
1) Hang up the sword as an archaic memento of the
past. Require it ro more.
2) Re-design the commnnd at see nin -s an internal
part of the aviators' wings or submariners'
dolphins for tnose authorized to wear it. In
the cese of other unrestricted line officers,
the pin could be worn above th<* ribbons. In
other words, keep the star but reduce the size.
3) Design other sleeve devices for those officers
who are not unrestricted line officers eligible
for command «t sea.
>/
1S
4. The Department of Defense cnn do much to improve pres-
tige. In the body of this p^per, some of the following
items were treated under the Department of the Wavy for
reasons explained previously. However, the following
recommendations ^re made tothe Department of Defense
where proposals are either approved before submission
to higher puthoritv, or sidetracked.
a. Establish a policy that apparent distortions of
the press will be investigated in full and vigor-
ously re-butted when possible. This should include
sensationalism, which can be easily recognized by
those in authority.
b. If pay legislation i s proposed in the ^uture, make
a determined effort to prevent the usual larger in-
crease for the lower pay grades. Insist that in-
centive to advance be paramount to drawing longevity,
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c. Make a determined effort to gear any future pay-
raise to the cost of living, after t he initial
raise adequately catches up to the present day.
d. Propose legislation to increp.se the quarters allow-
ance as soon as possible and gear it to rank, not
number of dependents. Make provision for sin ade-
quate increase for those who are assigned to high
cost of living area, where government quarters are
not available.
e. Conduct a feasibility study to determine the ad-
vantages «nd dis-advantages of placing Public
Quarters under the Industrial Fund concept.
f. Improve the overseas ouarters situation sufficient-
ly to allow for the concurrent trrvel of the service-
man and his dependents, if such serviceman is eligible
for government quarters.
g. Conduct a feasibility study to determine whether or
not it '-ould be advanta: eous to turn all non-remote
located commissaries end n^vy (^nd post) exchanges
over to a. concessionaire such cs a corporation of
retired service men, both officers and enlisted.
h. Conduct a complete investigation into dependent ^
m^dic^l care and dental care to determine if a
health insurance program would -ssist in cutting
down the number of doctors needed and, at the same time,
improve the care given to our dependents — at no cost
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